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THE AFFIRMATIVE SIDE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT*
Thomas I. Emerson**
Traditionally, the first amendment, like other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, has operated primarily as a negative force in maintaining the system of freedom of expression. It has served to prevent the government from prohibiting, harassing, or interfering
with speech or other forms of communication. On the other hand,
the first amendment has not been viewed as a significant factor in
efforts to promote freedom of expression or to impose limits on
governmental participation in the system.
There is growing concern now, however, with the affirmative side
of the first amendment. Major distortions in the system - failure
of the market place of ideas to operate according to the original
plan - have not been solved by the negative approach. The expansion of governmental powers, and the creation of a vast bureaucracy possessing great quantities of information and expertise,
have made the government a more pervasive participant in the system of freedom of expression. The underlying trend of modern
government toward social control by persuasion rather than by coercion likewise has enhanced greatly the government's affirmative
role in the system. New technologies, such as the use of the electronic media for two-way communication between citizen and
government, will have the same impact.
* The John A. Sibley Lecture in Law delivered at the University of Georgia School of
Law on April 11, 1981, revised and expanded for publication. For the purpose of improving
readability, footnotes have been placed only at the end of paragraphs.
** Lines Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale Law School.
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Most important, the development of rules for employing governmental powers to expand the system of freedom of expression,
while at the same time controlling and limiting those powers, is
emerging as one of the crucial problems of the future. As we move
inevitably toward some form of social control over our destinies,
the need to maintain a high degree of laissez-faire in the system of
freedom of expression, when laissez-faire is diminishing or disappearing in the economic sphere, poses a critical dilemma. Unless
we are able to resolve that dilemma, the system of freedom of expression as we hitherto have conceived it cannot continue to exist.
The primary initiative in affirmatively promoting the system of
freedom of expression must be undertaken by the legislative and
executive branches. Thus, one of the major advances in recent
years, the freedom of information and sunshine laws, is the creation of the federal and state legislatures. Nevertheless, there is a
vital role for the judicial branch of government. Some areas of potential expansion, such as the right of access and the right to know,
are suitable for judicial action. In any event, we must rely upon the
courts to impose limits on the legislative and executive branches
when they seek to promote or participate in the system. The countervailing powers that our courts have come to exercise through
the instrument of constitutional adjudication constitute a major
hope that other parts of the government can be kept in check.
The Supreme Court, it must be acknowledged, has been reluctant to give affirmative effect, not only to the first amendment, but
to other provisions of the Constitution that support our system of
individual rights. Thus, the Court has refused to construe the
equal protection clause as imposing an obligation on the government to eliminate racial inequalities except where it can be shown
that the government was directly and intentionally responsible for
the discrimination. The Court likewise has held within narrow confines the "fundamental rights" which are entitled to a special degree of constitutional protection. In the first amendment area, it
has failed to expand the right-of-access or right-to-know doctrines.
The unwillingness of the Court to take a positive position in promoting affirmative rights was epitomized in its decision in Harris
v. McRae. Upholding the validity of a government program subsidizing all medically necessary services for indigents except medically necessary abortions, the Court said: "[A]lthough government
may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her
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freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own
creation."'
The provisions in many state constitutions guaranteeing freedom
of expression are couched in more affirmative terms than in the
first amendment to the Federal Constitution. In place of stating
that "Congress [or the state legislature] shall make no law," most
state constitutions contain language similar to that of the Connecticut Constitution: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects." The state courts, however, usually have given the same interpretation to these provisions as the
2
United States Supreme Court has given to the first amendment.
The path toward developing the affirmative side of the first
amendment is beset with pitfalls. The courts are being asked to
deal with awesome problems. Governmental intervention in the
system of freedom of expression for affirmative purposes has a decided tendency to accentuate the distortions in the system. The
power of the majority, achieved through election of its representatives to positions of control within the government, is magnified by
the use of public funds and resources for the dissemination of majority points of view. The imprimatur of the government in itself
confers additional weight on official speech or officially sponsored
speech. Ideally, extensive measures for the encouragement of opposing speech are necessary, but these are unlikely to materialize
on any substantial scale. In any event, such measures are in most
instances beyond the capacity of the courts to initiate or maintain.
Confronted by this enormous disequilibrium, the courts may be
able to do little more than take the disparity into account in the
formulation of rules at those points where they do have some degree of control.
Moreover, the courts must create a whole new body of legal docHarris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980). Cases refusing to give affirmative effect to
the equal protection clause include Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Cases in which the Court refused to extend the "fundamental rights" doctrine include Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 379 U.S. 471 (1970). On the right
of access, see Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973); on the right to know, see Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); but cf. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
2 CONN. CONST. art. I, § 4. See Note, Private Abridgement of Speech and State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165 (1980). But see Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d
899, 592 P.2d 341 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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trine. Most of the traditional rules derived from the cases protecting freedom of expression from negative interference by government do not apply. The issues are not to be resolved in terms of
clear and present danger, full protection, prior restraint, and the
like. The balancing test is, of course, applicable in all types of
cases. One would hope, however, that more effective rules can be
formulated.
Nevertheless, regardless of the difficulties involved, the courts
are being called upon to deal with the problems. As one surveys
the field, it is apparent that bits and pieces of the puzzle are beginning to take shape. On the whole, indeed, there has been greater
progress than one casually might suppose.'
This article first examines some general issues pertaining to the
formulation of appropriate legal doctrine. It then explores problems raised by governmental promotion of the system of freedom
of expression. Finally, it deals with questions arising out of direct
governmental participation in the system through engaging in expression of its own.
I.

DOCTRINAL RESOURCES

Formulation of legal doctrine that will serve as a solid basis for
affirmative expansion of the system of freedom of expression is not
an easy task. Some commentators have expressed doubts that effective legal rules can be devised. The attempt must be undertaken, however, unless we are ready to abandon the whole effort to
bring the principles and power of4 the first amendment to bear
upon this area of growing concern.
3 Prior discussions of some of the problems may be found in J.A. BARRON, FR=Dom OF
THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973); B.C. SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC AccusS

(1976); Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public
Broadcasting,52 TEx. L. REV. 1123 (1974); Cass, First Amendment Access to Government
Facilities,65 VA. L. REV. 1287 (1979); Gottlieb, Government Allocation of First Amendment Resources, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 205 (1980); Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALn. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 565 (1980); Yudof, When Government Speaks: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863 (1979);
Note, The Constitutionalityof Municipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns,
93 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1980); Note, Access to State-Owned Communications Media - The
Public Forum Doctrine, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1410 (1979) (citing previous "public forum"
literature).
' For one expression of skepticism about the possibility of formulating satisfactory legal
principles, see Yudof, supra note 3, at 897-906.
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The Distinction Between Governmental Promotion and
Governmental Participation

It is helpful to begin the analysis by drawing a distinction between governmental promotion of the system of freedom of expression and governmental participation in the system. Although both
involve affirmative measures to expand the system or to make it
work more effectively, the types of controls available and appropriate are somewhat different.
Governmental promotion occurs when the government undertakes to facilitate use of the system by private (or nongovernmental) persons or groups. Examples are the granting of subsidies to
candidates in presidential elections, as provided in the Federal
Election Campaign Act, or the building of a cultural center for use
by community organizations. The resulting expression is private,
not governmental. Governmental participation occurs when the
communication emanates from the government itself, through a
government official, a government agency, or an institution controlled by the government. It is governmental, not private, speech
that results. Examples are the State of the Union address by the
President or a report issued by the Environmental Protection
Agency.
The reason for making the distinction is that, in the case of governmental promotion, one always can insist upon rules directed toward achieving a generally more vigorous and effective system of
expression. That is to say, the purpose of the governmental intervention

-

its only justification under the first amendment

-

is

that greater opportunity for expression, increased diversity, or similar improvements in the system will be secured. More precise rules
can be formulated around the achievement of these objectives.
This is not always true of governmental participation. In that area,
the objective is often a narrower one - to introduce a single additional voice, embodying a particular point of view, into the system.
The government is entitled to such a voice. It follows that, as in
the case of nongovernmental participation, the government must
have freedom to speak its piece, and the rules must make allowance for this. The result has the appearance of a paradox: the
greater the governmental intervention, the lesser the restrictions
placed upon the government's action.
The dividing line between governmental promotion and governmental participation is, of course, not always clear-cut. In some sit-
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uations, the governmental participation is less direct, in that the
expression involved may filter through some agency or institution
having some private features. Thus the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting is composed of private citizens appointed and funded
by the government. Moreover, certain types of governmental participation, such as public education and public libraries, though
operated entirely by government employees, are designed in some
degree to promote expression on the part of others. Nevertheless,
the distinction is a useful one. It focuses attention on the impact of
the governmental intervention upon the system of freedom of expression and encourages the development of more precise rules related to the actual operation of the system.
B.

The Dissenting Taxpayer Analysis

There have been suggestions that controls over governmental
promotion of, or participation in, the system of freedom of expression should be formulated in terms of the interests of the dissenting taxpayer. The argument is that governmental intervention for
affirmative ends always requires expenditure of public funds and
that a taxpayer should not be compelled to contribute to the support of expression with which that taxpayer disagrees. It is noted
that the Supreme Court has employed an analysis of this kind in
protecting the rights of members of private associations. Thus the
Court has held that where there is any governmental compulsion
to join a labor union, as in the case of a union shop sanctioned by
statute, the dues of such members cannot be used to promote political or ideological causes that those members oppose. 5
The dissenting taxpayer approach, however, is not useful where
governmental, as distinct from private, action is concerned. If applied generally, it would virtually eliminate all governmental expression or support of private expression. Countless objecting taxpayers would always exist, and the administrative problems would
be insuperable. Nor is the analogy between the government and a
private association sound. The government is an association of all
citizens, for manifold objectives, and all members must pay the
cost of any legitimate activity. On the other hand, the powers of
the government to compel membership in a private association and
1 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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to delegate its powers of taxation to that association are very limited. The individual is forced into a relationship that is far more
immediate, personal, and potentially offensive to one's individuality than is the relationship of a dissenting citizen to the state.
Hence the right of association must be protected more vigorously
than the right of a citizen to be free from unwelcome taxation.
In short, so far as the general taxpayer is concerned, there is no
basis for complaint so long as the government is operating within
the bounds of its authority. The system of freedom of expression
does not demand that the taxpayer have any greater control over
public funds expended for expression than over public funds expended for other operations of the government.'
C. The Establishment of Religion Analogy
It has also been suggested that, just as the first amendment prohibits "an establishment of religion," it should also be construed to
contain an implied prohibition against "political establishment."
Under this doctrine, the government would be prohibited from advocating "political" viewpoints or extending unequal assistance to
7
private dissemination of political ideas.
Here again, the approach does not appear promising. The analogy to the establishment of religion clause does not hold up. That
provision clearly excludes governmental expression, or governmental support of private expression, that aids or burdens religion or
any form of religion. A reasonably clear-cut area of expression is
singled out and specifically forbidden. But it cannot be said that
the first amendment similarly forbids all political expression. On
the contrary, the government could not operate under any such
prohibition. Hence the problem remains of separating out certain
forms of political expression, as well as nonpolitical expression,
which are outlawed. The criteria for doing that cannot be found in
the establishment of religion clause, which grew out of very different considerations and has very different foundations.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court, upholding the funding

£ For discussion of the dissenting taxpayer analysis, see Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 588-95;
Note, The Constitutionalityof Municipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns,
93 HARv. L. REv. 535, 549 (1980). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259
n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); L. TRmBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 588-91 (1978).
7The proposition is developed in Kamenshine, supra note 3.
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of presidential candidates, summarily rejected the establishment of
religion analogy, saying "the analogy is patently inapplicable to our
issue here."'
D. The Preferred-PositionPrinciple
In dealing with problems of negative interference by the government with freedom of expression, the fundamental principle of
constitutional adjudication is that the first amendment gives expression, as distinct from other conduct, a preferred position. This
means that, as a general proposition, individual and societal interests in freedom of expression must be preferred over other individual and societal interests. In short, such other interests may be
protected or advanced only by some means apart from control over
expression. The preferred-position principle, however, plays a
much diminished role when the affirmative side of the first amendment is involved. In such a context, the conflicts of interest are
mostly within the system, not between first amendment interests
and interests outside the system. In this situation, there is no issue
of weighing first amendment interests against other interests.
Rather, the basic principle underlying the formulation of most
doctrine dealing with the affirmative aspects of the first amendment is one of improving the performance of the system of freedom of expression. The goal is to maximize the values that the
system is designed to advance. The critical importance of the system in a democratic society still remains, but the accommodation
of first amendment interests largely takes place within the confines
of the system. In some respects, this rationale may be more readily
applied than many of those currently advanced for reconciling the
system of freedom of expression with other social goals.
E.

The Equal Protection Element

The concept of equal protection, whether emanating from the
equal protection clause or from an equal protection element in the
first amendment guarantee, plays a key role in providing affirmative support for the system of freedom of expression. Basically,
equal protection requirements demand fairness as between relevant interests in the dispensation of governmental support. Bes Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976).
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cause orthodox expression, such as an American Legion parade,
frequently requests and customarily receives governmental encouragement, the equal protection element assures that unorthodox expression of a similar form, such as a demonstration to protest the
draft, receives similar treatment. In other words, the price of not
promoting unorthodox speech would be not supporting orthodox
speech. Thus, a guarantee that some diversity will be achieved is
built into the system.
On the other hand, equal protection doctrine may not be quite
as sharp an instrument in controlling affirmative intervention by
government as in controlling negative action. In cases of governmental promotion, the facilities or funds available are nearly always limited, and thus the process of selection inherently involves
the exercise of greater discretion than in situations where governmental prohibition of any communication is outlawed. Where the
government participates in the system, its power to select the areas
and general character of the expression necessarily must be extensive. Hence some modification in the application of equal protection doctrine may be necessary in creating appropriate rules.
F.

The Level of Governmental Intervention and the MacroMicro Distinction

One key principle in affirmative first amendment cases involves
a distinction based upon the level of governmental intervention.
Broadly speaking, the government may support expression by selecting a general area, or a broad subject-matter, as the object of
its intervention, but may not control expression within that area. A
well-known example of this kind of control occurs in governmental
regulation of radio and television: the government may require a
broadcast licensee to devote a certain percentage of broadcast time
to public interest programs but may not censor or otherwise control the content of any particular program. The concept is also
found in the structure of a university: the administration makes
broad decisions with respect to the courses that shall be taught
and their basic subject matter, but the individual faculty member
is free to control the presentation in a particular classroom. 9
9 Governmental controls over broadcast programming, but not over a particular program,
were upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The macro-micro
structure of a university is embodied in the principles of academic freedom.
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This distinction between macro-intervention and micro-intervention is, of course, difficult to draw at times. Moreover, the
power to control the macro area can be manipulated to effect control of the micro area. Yet the concept is essential in developing
legal doctrine that permits governmental support of expression but
forbids governmental abuse of power.
Some sort of macro-micro distinction is inherent in the very notion of affirmative governmental support for the system of freedom
of expression. In terms of negative interference, the government
must keep its hands off all expression, regardless of the area or
subject matter. When, however, the government undertakes to encourage expression, it must choose some portion of the system to
support. In the exercise of this power, the negative commands of
the first amendment, including the equal protection element, must
be qualified, but the requirements of the system for freedom and
diversity must be reasserted at the earliest possible point. The
drawing of this macro-micro line thus becomes a crucial feature of
affirmative first amendment doctrine.
G. Balanced Presentationand Professional Judgment
Another concept that is crucial in fixing the constitutional
boundaries of affirmative governmental intervention in the system
of freedom of expression is the idea of a balanced presentation.
The doctrine derives from two basic features of our democractic
society. First, broadly speaking, it is the obligation of the government to represent all members of the community, not just one or
more particular groups. Second, the values of the system of freedom of expression, to a large degree, lie in promoting diversity, in
the full and free exchange of diverse ideas, experiences, and information. Hence governmental intervention for affirmative purposes
must be directed toward expanding, not contracting, the range of
fact and opinion available to the community. This obligation can
be expressed as the requirement of making or supporting a balanced presentation.
The concept of a balanced presentation also implies some standards for determining what forms of expression come within the
universe of discourse. Questions of relevancy, competency, rationality, and the like cannot be totally excluded. Here the only solution would appear to be the application of professional judgment,
that is, the standards utilized by the prevailing scholarly, scientific,
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literary, artistic, or other professional establishment. Such reliance

upon establishment standards has obvious drawbacks. The establishment, academic or otherwise, frequently has been shortsighted,
averse to new ideas, or blind to potential developments. Nevertheless, by training and position, it is likely to possess a certain degree
of tolerance and thereby be willing to accept somewhat greater diversity than single-interest groups. In any event, there may be no
other structure upon which to rely.
H. Right-to-Know Theory
The right to know, the reverse side of the right to communicate,
plays an important role in formulating doctrine concerned with affirmative governmental intervention in the system of freedom of
expression. This is true in part because there are many situations
where the focus of attention must be upon the rights of readers,
listeners, and viewers rather than upon the rights of speakers.
Thus, where governmental intervention is justified on grounds of
scarcity of physical facilities for communication, guiding principles
are found in consideration of the interests of the audience rather
than the interests of those wishing to communicate. Likewise, restrictions on governmental participation in the system are derived
largely from the impact on those who receive the communication,
not on persons seeking to engage in competing communication. Indeed, frequently only the recipients will have standing to challenge
the government's action.
In addition, an important aspect of governmental promotion of
the system of freedom of expression consists of the right to obtain
infromation from the government. Insofar as there is a constitutional obligation for the government to furnish such information, it
rests primarily upon the right-to-know doctrine.
I.

Institutional Structures to Protect the System
Because broad negative prohibitions are not available to safeguard the system of freedom of expression when the government
acts affirmatively to promote the system or to participate in the
system itself, it becomes particularly important to find institutional devices capable of modifying the impact of governmental intervention. Institutional measures can be devised, for instance, to
isolate administrators of the governmental intervention from partisan political forces. Structural forms also can be framed to utilize

806

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:795

professional training, standards, and discipline as a way of obtaining greater objectivity. Likewise, the principles of academic
freedom can be introduced into the system through the use of various structural devices. Other methods can be found for building a
certain amount of autonomy and diversity into the machinery employed for governmental intervention.
It is not clear to what extent the use of ameliorating structural
devices may be required as a matter of constitutional principle, enforceable by the courts. There is substantial precedent, however, to
suggest that the courts may go a considerable distance in this direction. Thus the Supreme Court has held that where a prior restraint of expression is allowed - an especially dangerous form of
control - the government must provide strict procedural guarantees, including rapid judicial review. The Court also frequently has
used the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines as a procedural device to compel the government to pay attention more seriously to
the impact of its regulations upon first amendment rights. These
procedural elements of first amendment doctrine have been invoked in situations involving negative interference by the government with freedom of expression. There is no reason why they
could not be similarly employed in affirmative promotion programs
that pose special dangers to the system of freedom of expression.
Even if precise rules could not be framed in constitutional terms,
the possibility of designing institutional protections certainly
would be an important factor in any judicial approach to maintaining the integrity of the system. 10
J.

Limitations of the DoctrinalResources
The doctrinal resources available for dealing with the constitutional problem arising out of the affirmative application of the first
amendment, at least at this stage of development, clearly have serious limitations. Many of the applicable legal principles can be
stated only in very loose form; they cannot match in precision the
doctrines available for protecting the system of freedom of expres10 Cases requiring especially strict procedures where prior restraint is sanctioned include
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland, 380

U.S. 51 (1965). For use of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines in the first amendment
area, see Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980);
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973). See also Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 H~nv. L. REv. 518 (1970).
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sion against negative interference by government. For this reason,
and also because of practical considerations, the nature of judicial
review in the affirmative area would be different from that in the
negative area. The courts cannot be expected to exercise detailed
supervision over the countless decisions made by the government
in the administration of affirmative programs or in its own participation in the system. In many areas, courts would be confined to
intervention only in egregious cases. They would retain a crucial
function, however, in keeping alive the basic principles at stake
and in gradually moving toward a more refined body of constitutional law.

II.

GOVERNMENTAL PROMOTION OF THE SYSTEM

Governmental promotion of the system of freedom of expression
is widespread and takes many forms. The first amendment imposes
corresponding controls. In some situations, governmental support
of private expression is mandatory, that is to say, constitutionally
required. In other situations, the government voluntarily creates
the mechanism for support, and constitutional conditions attach. A
common form of governmental promotion, the granting of funds
for private expression, raises special problems. Where facilities for
communication are scarce, or the government creates a monopoly,
further issues arise. In addition, the right to know has an impact in
some areas.
The legal rules to govern these varying situations must be based
upon the functions served by the system of freedom of expression
and the manner of its operation. It is possible here to discuss only
a few of the major issues.
A.

The Constitutional Obligation of the Government to Make
Facilitiesfor Expression Available

The effective operation of the system of freedom of expression
imposes, in some situations, an obligation on the government to
make facilities for expression available. The starting point for this
obligation is the right of the public to use the streets, parks, and
open places for meetings, parades, demonstrations, canvassing, and
similar forms of expression. Initially formulated in 1939 in Hague
v. C.I.O., the rule is now well-settled. The rationale for the rule has
been couched in historical terms, the right being said to have existed from "time out of mind." Essentially, however, the right de-
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rives from the needs of the system of freedom of expression. The
system demands access to an audience, and places where people
congregate in public are natural locations for those seeking to
reach potential listeners.11
The precise nature of the government's obligation should be
noted. Clearly, the right to use the streets, parks, and open places
may at times conflict with other uses of these facilities, such as
their use for traffic, relaxation, and the like. But the right of expression is not made subordinate to other uses. Rather, the rights
coexist, on a roughly equal plane, and the principles for resolving
conflicts is not subordination but accommodation of the various interests involved. Time, place, and manner controls are valid only
within this context, that is, in resolving issues of physical conflict.
Moreover, the principle is firm that the government may exercise
no control over the content of the expression and may not discrim12
inate between users on the basis of content.
The mandatory right of access to facilities extends, certainly in
theory, beyond the area of streets, parks, and open places. Public
facilities that serve the same purposes, are similarly suitable, and
are equally necessary to the system of freedom of expression are
impressed with the same constitutional obligation. Thus, public
buildings appropriate for indoor meetings, such as civic centers,
should be governed by the same rules. The Supreme Court has
never gone this far and the lower courts are likewise hesitant. Actually, the issue seldom has been pressed. The kind of facility in
question is usually available for orthodox expression, such as use
by patriotic organizations, and the nondiscrimination rule thus
opens the facility to all. The scope of the mandatory obligation
principle, however, is potentially extensive.
Other facilities that provide an opportunity for reaching an audience, or for otherwise engaging in expression, also must be made
available under current constitutional doctrine. These facilities are
of such a nature, however, that the right of expression is subject to
11Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
12 For cases in which use of the streets involving physical interference with other interests, such as the operation of sound trucks or disruption of a school, has been subject to
time, place, and manner regulation, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). For an unequivocal statement of the rule against
regulation of content, see Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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a strict rule of compatibility. Instead of applying the principle of
accommodation for all interests, the primary use of the facility is
fully protected and the opportunity for expression is conferred
only where it causes no interference with, or disruption of, the primary use. Thus the right of expression exists but only within interstices not occupied by the primary function.
The Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in recognizing this qualified right of access to public areas. In Brown v. Louisiana, the Court allowed a silent demonstration, protesting discrimination, in a public library. In Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, it upheld the right of students to express opposition to
the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands. But, in Adderley v.
Florida, a majority of the Court refused to allow a peaceful,
nondisruptive demonstration on the grounds of the county jail.
Also, in United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Associations, a majority of the Court held that mailboxes
used in the postal system did not constitute a limited public forum
open to access by civic associations wishing to distribute circulars
by placing them in the boxes. Indeed, the prevailing opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, came close to asserting that no public
forum would be recognized beyond those that had been considered
traditionally to be such. Despite this wavering on the part of the
Court, the constitutional right to use public facilities on a compatible basis seems well-established. The right, although qualified, is of
great importance to the system of freedom of expression. It forces
the relevant community to listen to the expression of grievances,
rather than allowing them to be swept under the rug.13
Of course, some public areas or facilities are totally foreclosed to
use by outsiders for purposes of expression. One obvious example
was noted by Justice Douglas in Adderley when he observed that
no one "would suggest that the Senate gallery is the proper place
for a vociferous protest rally." Nor would one suggest that the
pages of a government report, newsletter, or other publication be
open to nongovernmental expression. In such cases, the compatibility principle eliminates any obligation on the part of the govern"SUnited

States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 101 S. Ct. 2676

(1981); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). See also Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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ment to grant access to the forum. There is no way that nongovwithout destroying
ernmental expression can fit into such a facility
14
entirely the principal function of the facility.
Similarly, governmental facilities of a type that are readily available for nongovernmental expression need not be shared with private persons or groups. Thus, the printing presses of the Government Printing Office may be reserved exclusively for government
publications. On the other hand, a powerful argument can be made
that governmental monopoly of the airwaves for radio and television broadcasting, to the exclusion of private communicators,
would run counter to the affirmative obligation of the government
under the first amendment. Perhaps even the maintenance of the
postal service is sufficiently crucial to the system of freedom of expression that there is a constitutional obligation on the part of the
government to keep it in operation.
Access to facilities for communication is so crucial to the system
of freedom of expression that the right extends beyond governmental to certain privately owned facilities that can be considered
quasi-public in nature. Obviously, any general requirement that
private owners make their facilities available to other persons or
groups would curtail drastically the freedom of the owners to communicate, would entail an intolerable degree of governmental regulation, and soon would destroy the entire system of freedom of expression. Thus, as is clear from Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, there is no obligation on the part of a newspaper to accord any right to reply to a candidate for election who has been
attacked in its columns; indeed, action by a state legislature to
compel such access was held to violate the first amendment. On
the other hand, if the government allocates scarce facilities or
grants a monopoly to private owners, a different issue is presented.
This question is discussed at a later point. Likewise, where a private owner takes over traditional governmental functions and a
right of access for purposes of expression is compatible with the
conduct of the enterprise, there are persuasive grounds for holding
the private owner to the same obligations as the government. 15
The Supreme Court initially made a promising entry into this
"' Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 54 (1966). See generally Note, Access to State-Owned
Communications Media - The Public Forum Doctrine, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1410 (1979).
'5 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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area but recently has withdrawn substantially. As early as 1946,
the Court ruled in Marsh v. Alabama that the owners of a company town were obligated under the first amendment to allow use
of the streets and other company property for the exercise of first
amendment rights to the same extent as if the premises were publicly owned. In 1968, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v.
Logan Valley Plaza, the Court reached a similar conclusion with
respect to privately owned shopping centers, holding that the
shopping center was "the functional equivalent" of the business
district involved in Marsh. In 1974, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the
Court drastically cut back on Logan Valley, and in 1976, in Hudgens v. NLRB, Logan Valley was overruled. Marsh v. Alabama still
stands, but in the case of shopping centers, malls, and the like, the
Court has determined that property rights outweigh first amendment rights."6
The refusal of the Supreme Court to extend the Marsh doctrine
to new forms of quasi-public property not used for communication
purposes is unfortunate. It may well be that, where such private
property is concerned, the rule of compatibility rather than accommodation should be applied. In other words, first amendment
rights should be exercised in subordination to the primary function
of the facility involved. Such an approach would give the property
owner all the protection needed. Indeed, in PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, the Court conceded that no constitutional rights
of the property owner were invaded by a ruling of the California
Supreme Court requiring a shopping center to be open for the exercise of first amendment rights. The damage done to the system
of freedom of expression by precluding the use of quasi-public fa17
cilities, on the other hand, is substantial.
Despite the Supreme Court's current position on quasi-public facilities, these rules and precedents imposing an affirmative obligation on government to make certain facilities available for expression constitute an important feature of the system of freedom of
expression. They are of particular value, of course, in providing a
forum for unorthodox and unpopular expression, thereby partially
" Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972);
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 318 (1968);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
7 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88 (1980).
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offsetting domination of the mass media by more conventional
points of view. They also furnish the basic principles for maintaining a more effective system of free expression as the government's
role in the life of the nation expands.
B.

Voluntary Provision by the Government of Facilities for
Expression

More and more frequently, the government has undertaken voluntarily to establish facilities intended to be used by private individuals or groups for purposes of expression. These facilities may
be designed primarily for such use, as in the case of a civic center,
or may be designed for other purposes but made available also for
private use, as in the case of a school building. Because the government is acting voluntarily, no issue of a mandatory obligation is
present. Nevertheless, the government is not free of constitutional
restraints.
It has long been recognized that differentiation between users, if
clearly based upon the content of the specific ideas expressed, violates the first amendment. Thus, in Hannegan v. Esquire, decided
in 1946, the Supreme Court held that denial of second-class mailing privileges to Esquire magazine, on the ground that the magazine "did not contribute to the public good and the public welfare," infringed first amendment rights. Similarly, there is no
doubt that refusal to allow use of facilities because of race, sex, or
similar classifications would not meet constitutional standards. Beyond this point, however, the Supreme Court has not developed
any clear theory. 18
The issues have been posed in two Supreme Court decisions. In
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a municipal transit authority
made space in its cars available for commercial advertising but refused to accept political or public-issue advertising. The Supreme
Court upheld the practice. The plurality opinion noted that the
city argued that revenue from commercial advertising "could be
jeopardized," that passengers "would be subjected to a blare of political propaganda," and that there "could be lurking doubts about
v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946). For interesting lower court decisions of a
similar character, see Bonner-Lyons v. School Comm., 480 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1973); Toward
a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation, 417 F. Supp. 632
(D.R.I. 1976).

18Hannegan
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favoritism, and sticky administrative problems." These were, the
plurality opinion declared, "reasonable legislative objectives," and
hence the refusal to carry political and public-issue advertising
"does not rise to the dignity of a First Amendment violation."
Four dissenting Justices took the position that the city, having
opened a forum for communication, was barred from "discrimination based solely upon subject matter or content," except "where
the Government makes a clear showing that its action was taken
pursuant to neutral 'time, place and manner' regulations."' 19
Neither analysis of the problem is satisfactory. The plurality
opinion allows the government to differentiate solely on the basis
of some "reasonable objective," a position that gives virtually no
weight to first amendment considerations. The dissenters fail to
recognize the complications arising when the government is affirmatively promoting expression by providing facilities for a selected
area of expression. They argue that, once the "forum" has been
opened, the government may not regulate on the basis of content.
The issue before the Court, however, was what the scope of the
forum was. This issue is not resolved through "time, place, and
manner" theory.
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad raised the question
whether a municipal theater in Chattanooga could refuse to allow
presentation of the rock musical "Hair" on the ground that it
would not be" 'in the best interests of the community.'" The stan-

dard by which the right of access to the theater was to be determined is not made clear in the record. There is some indication
that the municipality intended to limit use of the theater to productions "suitable for exhibition to all citizens of the city, adults
and children alike," a standard that "Hair" could not meet. A majority of the Court held that the action of the municipal authorities
constituted a prior restraint and that the procedures followed had
not met the constitutional requirements for imposing a prior restraint. Three Justices, in dissent, contended that the city could
limit use of the theater to performances suitable "for the whole
family." They did not expand upon the reasons for drawing the
29 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304, 315, 317 (1974) (emphasis added). Justice Douglas, concurring on the ground that any "forced exposure" to advertising
violated rights of privacy, cast the fifth vote to uphold the city. Id. at 308 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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line at this point, except that Justice Rehnquist observed that such
a policy could not be "described as arbitrary or unreasonable."
20
Thus the Court again did not confront the underlying issues.
The problem involved is one of drawing the macro-micro distinction. At the macro level of intervention, the government is entitled
to determine the general area of expression that it undertakes to
promote; at the micro level, it must not control the content of the
expression. To state the problem in this way is by no means to
solve it, but it does focus attention upon the crucial factors that
must be taken into consideration. It leads to a search for a solution
that least offends and best promotes the system of freedom of
expression.
In Lehman the line between commercial speech and political or
public-issue speech, so far as furnishing advertising space is concerned, is a narrow one. Moreover, if either form of expression is to
be given preference, it would not be commercial speech which, until recently, was not even considered to be within the system of
freedom of expression. In addition, the reasons advanced for excluding political and public-interest speech from the forum do not
carry much weight in terms of the function of the system. The
financial costs of maintaining first amendment rights is not ordinarily a factor to be taken into account. Aside from the right of privacy, which the majority did not invoke, the system does not contemplate that citizens be spared "the blare of political
propaganda." Neither the "lurking doubts about favoritism" nor
"sticky administrative problems" constitute reasons for curtailment of first amendment rights. Hence the refusal to accept political or public-interest advertising is not a valid macro distinction
but an invalid micro distinction.
Southeastern Promotions presents a different picture. In the
system of freedom of expression, the gap between the rights of
children and the rights of adults is a broad one. The system assumes a degree of maturity on the part of the participants that
children do not possess. The Supreme Court consistently has recognized that important differences do exist. One would be hard put
to say, therefore, that the city of Chattanooga could not maintain a
facility devoted to theatrical production suitable for children and,
in that sense, "for the whole family." Such a selection would qual20

Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 548, 569, 572 (1975).
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ify as a macro distinction and would be valid. It is very doubtful,
however, that the city of Chattanooga intended or practiced such a
distinction. If the design or actuality did not conform to the macro
distinction, then the refusal to allow the presentation of "Hair"
(apart from a valid finding of obscenity) constituted a micro distinction based upon content and was invalid.2 1
The voluntary furnishing of facilities by the government is likely
to grow in importance as economic and technical developments
make access to the media of communication more difficult for individuals or groups without substantial financial resources. This
growth of governmental promotion of the system brings with it serious dangers. Yet they can be kept to a minimum by stringent
application of the macro-micro distinction. Once this issue has
been resolved, the principles for safeguarding the system become
relatively precise. No difference on the basis of specific content is
permissible.
Here again, we find certain built-in protections for the system.
The pressures for government to supply facilities for orthodox
speech carry with them the requirement of similar support, within
the macro area, for unorthodox speech.
C. Government Subsidies
Governmental promotion of expression frequently takes the
form of a government subsidy. At the present time, governmental
funding of private expression is widespread, ranging from financing
of presidential candidates to support of scientific study and research to provision for cultural activities. The volume of expression
dependent upon governmental resources is likely to increase as
time goes on. Plainly, this dependency raises serious questions for
the system of freedom of expression.
The controlling principles are the same as for other forms of voluntary governmental support for the system. The government may
select the general area for subsidization - that is, make macro distinctions - but it may not dictate the content of a specific com' For cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized the difference between first
amendment rights of children and adults, see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 212-13 (1975); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944). See also Garvey, Children and the FirstAmendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 321
(1979).
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munication - that is, make micro distinctions. Both judgments
are likely to raise more difficult problems, however, when the government is supplying funds than when it is simply furnishing physical facilities for communication. 2
In the only decision where it squarely faced these issues, the Supreme Court upheld the basic right of the government to subsidize
expression but failed to deal adequately with some important
macro problems in defining the area selected for governmental
support. Buckley v. Valeo involved a challenge to public financing
of presidential election campaigns. The legislation established a
fund, derived from general revenues, to be used for financing party
nominating conventions, general election campaigns, and primary
campaigns. The amount of money made available for nominating
conventions and the general election campaign varied as between
"major" parties, "minor" parties, and "new" parties. Major parties,
defined as those whose candidate obtained twenty-five percent or
more of the popular vote in the most recent election, received substantial fixed amounts. Minor parties, defined as those whose candidate obtained at least five percent but less than twenty-five percent in the last election, received a percentage of the major party
entitlement based on the proportion of their votes to the average
of the major parties. New parties, those receiving less than five
percent of the vote in the last election, as well as newly created
parties, received no financing, except that a new party receiving
five percent or more in the ensuing election could obtain post-election payments under the same formula as minority parties. Funding for primary election campaigns was made available for candidates who raised at least $5000, counting only the first $250 from
each person, in each of twenty states. These funds were calculated
on a matching basis, allowing each candidate an amount equal to
the private contributions received, up to $250 per contributor. No
comparable funds were available for candidates who did not run in
party primaries but attempted to get on the ballot through petition or by other means.2 s
22 We are not dealing here with the situation where the government spends public funds

to purchase materials according to its own specifications, as where it contracts with a consulting firm to purchase a documentary or a report on a particular issue. Such use of government funds involves governmental participation in the system of expression and raises issues considered at a subsequent point.
2' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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The Supreme Court had no trouble in sustaining the basic constitutionality of the subsidy scheme. It summarily ruled that the
expenditures were authorized by the general welfare clause. After
rejecting arguments based on analogy to the religion clauses of the
first amendment, the Court disposed of the contention that the
legislation violated the free speech clauses of the first amendment
in two sentences:
[The legislation] is a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the
electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people. Thus
[it] . . . furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment

values.24

Inasmuch as partisan political activity is a highly sensitive area
so far as governmental intervention is concerned, the approval of
public funding in this area would seem to imply a broad acceptance by the Supreme Court of any public funding of expression
that could be found to promote the system of freedom of expression. In this respect, the decision in Buckley v. Valeo became a
major constitutional landmark.
On the other hand, the selection of an area for subsidization the macro level of governmental intervention - presented more
difficult issues. The subsidy program excluded any political party
that obtained less than five percent of the vote in the most recent
election, except for the possibility of post-election funding. It also
refused funds at the primary stage to parties not holding conventions and to candidates not participating in primary elections. The
result was that the area lines were drawn greatly to the disadvantage of minority parties and independent candidates. On the face
of it, the selection of the area for promotion would not seem to
conform to the requirements of the first amendment.
The Supreme Court treated this issue purely as one involving a
nonsuspect classification under the equal protection clause. The
fact that the government could show some "reasonable" grounds
for the distinction was held sufficient. At the same time, the Court
drastically underplayed the damage done to the system of freedom
of expression by excluding minority parties and partially excluding
14 Id. at 92-93.
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independent candidates. It dismissed the harm done to minority
interests as "speculative" and insufficient to "overcome the force of
the governmental interests against use of public money to foster
frivolous candidacies, create a system
of splintered parties, and en'25
courage unrestrained factionalism.

The response of the Supreme Court is not adequate to deal with
the delicate problems raised by governmental subsidization of expression. The reasonable classification standard of the equal protection clause assures that virtually any decision made by the government as to the area of support will be upheld; some substantial
reason usually can be found for any distinction. The government
must have leeway in making the macro judgment involved but, because first amendment rights are at stake, the courts should utilize
a more rigorous test, one that takes into full account the significance of the line drawn for the system of freedom of expression.
Under the subsidy scheme adopted by Congress, all new and minority parties were totally excluded. Such parties traditionally
have played a significant role in the system of freedom of expression, not by winning elections but by presenting alternative policies to the electorate. The same is true of independent candidates.
Very few of such parties or candidates receive five percent of the
vote. Moreover, government funds, whether at the level set in the
legislation before the Court or at higher levels sanctioned by the
decision, have a major impact upon all participants in the election
parties, candidates, and the electorate. It would seem to follow
that complete elimination of support for all minority parties and
independent candidates cannot be reconciled with a healthy system of freedom of expression. It is not that the system necessarily
must provide all participants equal or proportionate facilities for
communication. The system does require, however, that there be
adequate opportunity for minority viewpoints to be heard - to
obtain a foothold from which to grow, if and when accepted. The
governmental promotion embodied in the legislation approved in
Buckley v. Valeo does not provide this opportunity.
Distinctions made at the micro level in connection with government subsidies are likely to raise even more difficult issues. The
problem is that, in the case of promotion by financial subsidy, the
government is not simply providing an instrumentality for expres25

Id. at 101.
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sion and inviting all users who fit within the macro qualifications
to utilize it. In that situation, decisions as to who is entitled to take
advantage of the governmental promotion can be determined by
relatively objective rules. In the subsidy situation, unless there are
unlimited funds or limited recipients, the government is affirmatively selecting the grantee and thereby focusing on the expression
contemplated by that recipient. Hence the government is drawn
into the process of making detailed judgments about specific content. Thus the grant-making machinery usually requires the government to scrutinize concrete proposals with a view to determining the competency of the grantee, the validity of the ideas
expressed, the effectiveness of the techniques to be used, and even
the quality of taste exhibited. These are all highly subjective judgments of the very kind that government is not supposed to make
at the micro level.
How, then, is it possible to keep the government within the
bounds required by the system of freedom of expression? No easy
answer is presently available, but certain general considerations
can be stated.
In the first place, certain areas should be closed to promotion by
government subsidy or open only to the kinds of subsidy that can
be controlled by reasonably objective rules. There are, in other
words, some forms of government subsidy that are simply incompatible with the system of freedom of expression and therefore not
constitutionally permissible. One such area is religion, although
that result would be determined by the religion clauses of the first
amendment without regard to the free expression clauses. Another
area might be partisan politics, except where the class of recipients
is determined objectively, such as all candidates in an election, and
the funds are subject to no control over content. Other areas might
be added as experience grows.
Beyond this, there may be circumstances where the government,
although entitled to make distinctions at the micro level on the
basis of content, has unduly narrowed the range of ideas for which
the subsidy is available and thereby violated the principle of balanced presentation. Issues of this nature were presented in Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, a case the Supreme Court declined
26
to review.
"4

Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
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In Thomson, the New Hampshire Commission on the Arts had
been set up to administer grants-in-aid to individuals and groups
whose artistic endeavors had "substantial artistic and cultural significance." Grants over $500 had to be submitted to the Governor
and Executive Council of New Hampshire for final approval.
Under this program, the Commission made a grant to the publishers of Granite, a journal of poetry, fiction, translations, and letters.
When the grant came up for renewal, the Commission voted Granite a second award of $750. At a meeting of the Governor and
Council, the grant was approved. Immediately thereafter, the Governor and members of the Council were shown a poem that had
been printed in Granite,entitled "Castrating the Cat." The Governor and Council then reconvened the meeting and reversed their
decision. The Governor characterized the poem as "an item of
filth," and the letter of notification to the Commission explained
the rejection upon the ground that Granite had published "obscenities." There was no claim, however, that the poem was legally
27

obscene.

The publishers of Granite and others brought suit against the
894 (1976).
27 532 F.2d at 793 & n.2. The poem reads as follows:
CASTRATING THE CAT
-It is better to marry than to burnSt. Paul
you may keep both balls preserved in a jar
on the mantle piece
he will be tamer more loving
to his keepers
he will not stray after cat cunt
and his urine will not smell
should he spray the mattress
-a simple swipe of scapel [sic]
along the scrotum

and it is donedo not let the image of your own hulk
drawn down a bannister of razor blades
finger the inside of your sac
think of him as a tenor in the choir
-and it is done
the nurse washes her hands of him
yes she smiles we clipped his wings-
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Governor and the Council alleging that the grant had been denied
on the basis of a "personal adverse reaction" and that this constituted a denial of their first amendment rights. The district court
dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed. The court of appeals held that the public funding of the
arts was constitutional, citing Buckley v. Valeo, but declined to
review the government's decision to reject an application for a
grant. "The decision to withhold support," the court said, "is unavoidably based in some part on the 'subject matter' or 'content' of
expression, for the very assumption of public funding of the arts is
that the decision will be made according to the literary or artistic
worth of competing applicants." Hence, it concluded, "the standard of artistic merit.. . and guidelines elaborating it do not lend
themselves to translation into first amendment standards." The
court did say, however, that "a claim of discrimination would be
another matter": "distribution of arts grants on the basis of such
extrinsic considerations as the applicants' political views, associations, or activities would violate the equal protection clause, if not
the first amendment, by penalizing the exercise of those
'2
freedoms.

8

The dilemma posed by Thomson is not readily resolved. Indeed,
the problem is not limited to expression on cultural matters; it extends to government subsidy programs concerned with scientific,
economic, social, political, and other areas of expression. One cannot take the position that there are no constitutional limits; the
possibilities of abuse are too obvious. Nor can one expect the
courts to exercise a detailed and refined supervision over the award
of government grants. Yet, in egregious cases, the courts have an
obligation to act. Their judgment must be based upon the proposition that government subsidization of a single, narrow set of ideas
does not promote the system of freedom of expression. A minimum
degree of diversity is essential to the health of the system. The
judgment as to when the boundaries have been drawn too narrowly

28

as above the errors flesh is heir to
like St. Simeon on his desert pole
unwashed in rags
who picked up each worm that fell
from his arm bid it eat and put it back
Michael McMahon
532 F.2d at 794, 795, 797-98 & n.8.
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must rest upon existing professional standards and the general
"state of the art." The courts can draw guidance in such situations
from an analogy to the academy. The principles of academic freedom require some degree of balanced presentation, artistic freedom for the individual recipient, and judgment by persons competent to appraise. As vague as these guidelines are, they are better
than no limitations.
Applying such principles, it would appear that Governor Thomson and the Executive Council were unwilling to allow the recipients of the fund sufficient first amendment space. Theirs was not a
professional judgment but, as the circumstances showed, a hasty,
personal one. The government of New Hampshire had no obligation to award grants for "artistic and cultural" expression, but
when it decided to do so, it was bound to accord the recipients a
wider range of ideas and tastes than was accorded Granite.
Vindication of first amendment rights, even to the limited degree here proposed, raises difficult problems of implementation.
Nevertheless, it is important that the principles be establishd, that
both the government and the public comprehend what the Constitution requires, and that the legal standard be elaborated and refined through the process of application in concrete cases.
In the final analysis, protection against abuses in programs for
government subsidization of expression probably will be found
mainly in institutional devices for assuring that the goals of the
system of freedom of expression are realized. As noted above, one
such device is the delegation of power to make decisions at the
micro level to an independent group of persons, distinguished in
their field and relatively isolated from partisan political forces or
single-issue interests. Thus, as Professor Shiffrin has pointed out,
the key defect of the program involved in Thomson was that the
Governor and Executive Council of the state, all purely political
figures, had the power to set aside the decisions of the Commission
on the Arts.29

" Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 646. For further discussion of institutional arrangements
designed to protect the system, see Canby, supra note 3; Kamenshine, supra note 3; Karst,
Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on Southeastern Promotions, 37
OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 257-59 (1976); Shiffrin, supra note 3; Yudof, supra note 3.
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D. Scarcity of Physical Facilities and Government-Created
Monopoly of Facilities
Governmental promotion of the system of freedom of expression
may take place when a scarcity of physical facilities for communication exists or when the government itself has created a monopoly
of such facilities. The need for governmental intervention becomes
acute when the physical scarcity occurs in a major medium of communication, such as radio or television. A hands-off position by the
government in such a situation would result in grave distortion of
the system, chaos in the system, or both. A similar distortion occurs, on a smaller scale, when the government awards a monopoly
of certain facilities to a single communicator.
The problems occasioned by physical scarcity or governmental
monopoly must be distinguished from those caused by economic
scarcity. The system of freedom of expression is by definition a
laissez-faire system and must tolerate differences in the economic
capacity of the various participants. Some governmental intervention to assist those further down the economic ladder is often desirable, as the government-subsidy programs demonstrate. But any
attempt to eliminate all differences based on economic factors
would involve governmental regulation and governmental domination on a scale that would destroy the system.
Governmental regulation of access to scarce physical facilities, or
to a government-created monopoly, is more manageable. Yet there
are serious complications. The rules framed for governmental intervention must take into account not only the rights of those entrusted with control of the facilities, but also the rights of those
seeking to use the facilities and the rights of those receiving the
communication. Accommodation of these three, often conflicting,
interests is not readily achieved.
The most important area where physical scarcity exists is in radio and television communication. There is currently a dispute as
to whether physical scarcity still exists in this area. That controversy will not be reviewed here. Suffice it to say that, first, the Supreme Court continues to act on the premise of scarcity and, second, we certainly have not reached the point where access to radio
and television facilities is available to the same degree as the
streets, printing presses, motion picture cameras, and other means
of communication.
As already noted, there is a strong mandatory element present
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with respect to the electronic facilities. The state may "own" the
airwaves but it cannot withhold the use of such facilities from its
citizens any more than it could withhold the use of the streets or
prohibit the manufacture of printing presses. If the electronic media are to fit within the system of freedom of expression, the government must exercise its obligation to make them available to potential participants in the system, both communicators and
listeners. The issue has never been raised in such a stark form. But
this affirmative constitutional obligation underlies and shapes the
formulation of legal doctrine in this area.
The major exposition by the Supreme Court of the constitutional position of the various participants concerned with the electronic media was rendered in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
decided in 1969. In that case, upholding the fairness doctrine
against a challenge that it abridged the first amendment rights of
the broadcasting stations, the Court laid down three interlocking
principles. First, the Court declared: "It is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." By way of emphasis, it repeated: "It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." Second, as
to the rights of the licensees, the Court said:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency
with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary
with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise,
by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.
Third, with respect to those using the electronic media for communication, including the licensees themselves, the Court made clear
that the first amendment "forbids FCC interference with 'the right
of free speech'" in the broadcasting of particular programs. Implicit in the Court's decision was a fourth principle: to some extent, at least, persons other than the government's licensees have a
constitutional right to use scarce facilities. As the Court said:
"There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship [that is, for the licensees "to communicate only
their own views on public issues"] operating in a medium not open
to all." On these four propositions, it may be said, the constitu-
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tional structure of the electronic media rests.30
The actual system of regulation for the electronic media, established by Congress in the Federal Communications Act and elaborated by the FCC, does not take full advantage of the constitutional possibilities. Congress rejected a system of governmental
allocation of available broadcast time among all potential participants. It likewise refused to establish a common-carrier system,
under which licensees would be required to open their facilities to
those seeking to use them. Instead, it created a hybrid system,
with major emphasis on the rights of licensees as communicators.
Individual broadcasters were given a free license to operate on a
particular wavelength subject only to certain restrictions pertaining to the extent of their monopoly, certain responsibilities as
to outsiders
trustees to the listening public, and certain obligations
3
who seek to use their facilities for communication. 1
The main restrictions upon the monopoly powers of licensees are
antitrust in character. They relate to the number of stations that
may be owned by a single licensee, the relationship of networks to
individual stations, joint ownership of broadcasting stations and
newspapers in the same locality, and similar matters. These regulations have been uniformly upheld by the Supreme Court and pre32
sent no serious constitutional problem.
The responsibilities of licensees to the listening public are based
upon the provisions of the Federal Communications Act that
broadcasting licenses be issued and renewed on the basis of "public
interest, convenience and necessity." Under this "public interest"
standard, the FCC has imposed certain requirements designed to
achieve some balance in the character of the programs offered. It
also has developed and applied the fairness doctrine, under which
licensees must provide reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
issues of public importance and make provision for the various
points of view on such issues to be presented. But the Federal
Communications Act specifically forbids governmental censorship
of particular programs. These provisions are a classic example of
permitting governmental intervention at the macro level to proRed Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90, 392 (1969).
:'Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2 FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
30
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mote the system while prohibiting governmental interference at
the micro level. They, too, have been consistently upheld by the
Supreme Court.3 8
Provision for access by outsiders to radio and television facilities
is meager. If, in the course of a presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, a personal attack is made upon
any identifiable person, that person must be given a chance to reply. Also, if one candidate for an elective office is granted time, a
station must make equal time available to other candidates for
that office. Similarly, if a station endorses one candidate, it must
give other candidates an opportunity to respond. Recently, Congress has provided that candidates for federal elective office must
be allowed to purchase "reasonable amounts of time." Otherwise,
34
access to broadcasting facilities is determined by the licensees.
The structure thus established for the use of radio and television
facilities would seem to constitute the bare minimum demanded by
the affirmative side of the first amendment. It falls far short of
meeting the standards of a thriving, successful system of freedom
of expression. The Supreme Court, however, has shown no inclination to press the requirements of the first amendment any further.
Indeed, in Columbia BroadcastingSystem v. DemocraticNational
Committee, a majority of the Court ruled that, although a broadcasting station accepted paid commercial advertising, it had no obligation under the first amendment to accept paid political advertising. The Court did not pass upon the power of Congress or the
FCC to require licensees to accept political advertising, but
strongly indicated such a measure would be upheld. Thus, while
the basic constitutional framework remains in place, little advance
can be anticipated so far as the judiciary is concerned. More progress, such as additional requirements that radio and television be
open to all political candidates, would seem to rest in the hands of

33 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The provision against censorship of particular programs
is 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
The personal-attack rule and the rule giving a political candidate the opportunity to
respond were upheld by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973). The requirement of reasonable time for federal candidates was upheld in Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
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the legislative and executive branches. 5
The advent of cable television may alter substantially the constitutional framework of the electronic media. By substituting wires
for airwaves, it is possible to bring to the viewer a virtually unlimited number of channels. Hence the scarcity factor is greatly reduced or eliminated. The impact on the rights of broadcasters,
communicators, and recipients will depend upon the ultimate
structure of the cable-television system. If opportunities to seek an
audience on cable television become as open as opportunities to
communicate by use of the streets or printing presses, then governmental intervention to promote the interests of the communicators
or recipients would be confined largely to antitrust measures. On
the other hand, if elements of physical scarcity remain, or the effect of prior scarcity persists, an affirmative obligation under the
first amendment would continue. The burden of meeting such an
obligation would fall for the most part on the legislative and executive branches, but the formulation of doctrine and its application
in appropriate instances remain the responsibility of the courts.
In addition to areas where physical scarcity occurs naturally, as
in the case of radio and television, the creation of a government
monopoly may have a very similar effect upon the system of freedom of expression. In such a situation, affirmative rights under the
first amendment likewise may arise. An interesting example of the
problem is presented by ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. Public Service
Commission, decided in 1980. The issue there arose out of the
practice of the Consolidated Edison Company, a public utility, to
include in the billing envelopes sent to its customers inserts dealing with "the benefits of nuclear power" and similar controversial
issues. The New York Public Service Commisson prohibited the
practice, and Consolidated Edison challenged that order as violating its first amendment rights. On this negative interference issue,
the Supreme Court, two Justices dissenting, upheld the Consolidated Edison position. The Court did not have before it, and hence
did not decide, the latent affirmative promotion issue involved in
the case. In view of the monopoly position of the public utility,
what were the first amendment rights of potential communicators
and the general public to have the billing facilities of the utility
available to present or hear other sides of the questions under
35

Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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discussion? 6
There is much to be said for the proposition that the first
amendment rights of the third parties should be given recognition
here. As a result of the monopoly granted by the government, the
utility possessed a unique facility for communication, namely, a
ready-made audience that was forced to open the billing envelope
when it arrived in the home or office. Access to that facility, in a
manner compatible with the primary function served by the billing
apparatus, plainly would advance the discussion of important issues. Granting access to all comers might not be compatible with
effective operation of the billing process. But imposition of a fairness doctrine, under which the utility was required to make adequate provision for the presentation of opposing views, surely
would be feasible. The use of the first amendment in such a manner would promote significantly the system of freedom of
expression.
E. The Right to Know
Right-to-know doctrine, as previously noted, plays an important
role in justifying various forms of governmental promotion, such as
subsidies, and in determining the scope of governmental intervention where allocation of scarce facilities is necessary. It also has the
potential of providing a constitutional basis for obtaining from the
government information necessary to enrich the system of freedom
of expression. Its value for this purpose seemed to have come to a
dead-end with the decisions of the Supreme Court in Houchins v.
KQED in 1978 and Gannett Co. v. DePasqualein 1979. The promise of the right-to-know doctrine was revived suddenly in 1980,
however, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.3 7
Prior to Houchins, the Supreme Court had been urged to recognize a first amendment right to compel the government to disclose
information by giving newspaper reporters access to prisons and
3' Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
37 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978). In general, on right-toknow doctrine, see Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q.
1; Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 464-67
(1980). Citation to other discussions may be found in O'Brien, The First Amendment and
the Public's "Right to Know," 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 579 (1980); Note, The First Amendment Right to Gather State-Held Information, 89

YALE

L.J. 923 (1980).

1981]

FIRST AMENDMENT

their inmates. The Court had refused to do so in the particular
instances before it but had left a general impression that such a
right to obtain information did exist under some circumstances.
Houchins, however, appeared to eliminate any such hope; in a
four-to-three decision, the Court rejected another effort by the
press to obtain access to a prison. Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, declared: "Neither
the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a
right of access to government information or sources of information within the government's control." Justice Stewart, concurring,
agreed that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by the government." The position seemed confirmed a year
later in Gannett when, in a five-to-four vote, the Court upheld a
trial judge in excluding the public and the press from a criminal
pretrial hearing, giving virtually no weight to first amendment
claims.3 8
Richmond Newspapers involved a challenge to an order of a trial
judge excluding the public and the press from a criminal trial. In a
seven-to-one decision the Supreme Court held that, absent an
overriding interest articulated in findings, the exclusion was invalid. There were six opinions, but all the Justices in the majority
agreed that the first amendment required that the public and the
press have access to a criminal trial.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Stevens, emphasized that criminal trials historically had been "open to all who
cared to observe," noted that the "core purpose" of the first
amendment was to assure "freedom of communication on matters
relating to the functioning of government," concluded that the
"First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone
to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees,"
and quoted right-to-know language from earlier decisions to support his position. He did not mention Houchins but distinguished
the earlier prison cases on the ground that penal institutions were
not "open" or public places. Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, called the decision "a watershed case," saying: "Today.

.

.for

" Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391-93, 401-06 (1979); Houchins v. KQED,
438 U.S. 1, 15, 16 (1978). See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgement
of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First
Amendment." Justices Stewart and Blackmun were less enthusiasthe first amendment compelled the result
tic, but agreed that 39
reached by the Court.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that prior
cases had never ruled out the proposition that "public access to
information may at times be implied by the First Amendment and
the principles which animate it." He elaborated:
[T]he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment
to free expression and communicative interchange for their
own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of government. .

.

. Implicit in

this structural role is not only "the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
. . . but the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate - as well as other civic behavior - must be informed.

The structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive,
and thus entails solicitude not only for communication itself,
but for the indispensable conditions of meaningful
communication.40
Justice Brennan proceeded to carry right-to-know doctrine to a
further stage. He noted that "the stretch of this protection is theoretically endless." Hence "[a]n assertion of prerogative to gather
information must accordingly be assayed by considering the information sought and the opposing interests invaded." Justice Brennan suggested two helpful principles. First, "the case for a right of
access has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital
tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information." Second, "the value of access must be measured in specifics";
"what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular
government process is important in terms of that very process." '
Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. However, his
39 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-80, 582-83 (1980).
40 Id. at 587-88 (italics in original).
41

Id. at 589.
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views in the prison cases, including a dissent in Houchins, were
close to those of Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Rehnquist
dissented, believing that the reasons for closing a trial to the public
should not be subject to judicial review.42
It is difficult to assess the impact of the Richmond Newspapers
case. The decision can be viewed as a very narrow one, limited to a
situation where the information sought historically has been available to the public and the press. In this sense, Richmond Newspapers is little more than a negative-interference case, protecting the
press against governmental infringement upon a traditional right.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court did hold, for the first time,
that the first amendment does compel the government to furnish
some information. Moreover, the language of the opinions is supportive of a broad application of right-to-know doctrine to the
gathering of information. Four Justices - Brennan, Marshall,
Powell, and Stevens - seem prepared to go some distance, and
Justice Brennan's effort to delineate some subsidiary principles
should move the argument along. Where these conflicting forces
will lead cannot now be predicted. Meanwhile, of course, the major
burden of compelling the government to furnish information to the
public and the press is borne by the freedom of information acts
and the sunshine laws.
III.

GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION IN THE SYSTEM

Governmental participation in the system of freedom of expression takes many forms. It includes speeches by government officials, press releases and press conferences, publication of periodicals such as the Monthly Labor Review and the Smithsonian,
operation of the public schools, maintenance of public libraries and
museums, and many other activities. The volume of governmental
participation grows as society becomes more complex and more dependent on collective action. Governmental expression is necessary, and indeed is an integral part of the system, but it also poses
dangers for the system. It is imperative, therefore, to formulate the
basic principles that justify governmental participation in expression and to develop the limitations necessary to keep the system
open and vigorous.
1,Id. at 604-06. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435

U.S. 765, 776-78 (1978) (Powell,
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We start with the proposition that, in general, governmental participation in the system of freedom of expression is constitutionally
permissible. Moreover, the government clearly has wide latitude.
There are no overall requirements of neutrality, of balanced presentation, of accuracy, of fairness, of equal time for opposing views,
or the like. The government's right of expression, in short, runs
parallel in many respects to that of any other participant in the
system.43
There are, however, some recognized limitations. The government may not employ expression in a coercive way, as a sanction,
to accomplish results not constitutionally or statutorily authorized.
Although there are no Supreme Court decisions expressly on the
point, it would seem clear that the government may not use expression in a manner that violates the constitutional right of privacy of any person. Subordinate government subdivisions, deriving
their powers by delegation from a superior authority, may not engage in forms of expression that would be ultra vires. Moreover,
various kinds of indirect controls exist. Thus, countervailing expression from nongovernmental sources is protected by the negative noninterference rules of the system and encouraged by programs of governmental promotion.4 4
These forms of restraint on governmental expression are not discussed here. Rather, attention is given to some less well-charted
areas that are beginning to assume importance. First, there are certain forms of governmental participation, such as expression directed at a captive audience or governmental expression where the
source is concealed, which are incompatible with any system of
freedom of expression. Second, certain areas, such as expression
advancing a religious view or supporting a partisan political candidate, are foreclosed to government. Third, in the operation of certain government institutions designed to educate and inform the
43 For Supreme Court recognition of the general right of the government to expression,
see Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). For general discussion of governmental participation, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697-716 (1970); Canby, supra note 3; Shiffrin,
supra note 3; Yudof, supra note 3.
" With respect to governmental expression as a sanction, see Bantam Books v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963); Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D.
Cal. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979). On the ultra vires issue,
see Yudof, supra note 3, at 912-17. See also T. EMERSON, supra note 43, at 697-716.
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citizenry, governmental expression must meet certain standards
and allow for diversity. Fourth, certain structural arrangements,
such as the creation of semi-independent agencies, are available to
introduce a degree of autonomy and promote diversity in governmental expression.
A.

The Captive Audience and Covert Expression

Several forms of governmental expression are in blatant conflict
with the system of freedom of expression. The most important of
these is expression directed at a captive audience. The government's right to speak does not extend to a right to compel anyone
to listen. Compulsory listening is the counterpart of compulsory
expression of a belief. The requirement that any person entertain a
belief, opinion, or idea, or be forced to listen to the government's
version of events, is an affront to dignity and an invasion of autonomy. It is in direct opposition to the principle that citizens have
the sovereign power to instruct their government. Moreover, it is
hardly an effective method for discovering the truth or arriving at
a consensus. Indeed, compulsion to listen is the hallmark of a to45
talitarian society.
The basic principle involved is widely accepted. It was recognized, at least by some members of the Supreme Court, thirty
years ago in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, where passengers on buses regulated by the District of Columbia Public Utility
Commission were subjected to radio broadcasts of music and news,
and has been reiterated on a number of occasions since that time.
Commentators uniformly have extolled the principle. Frequently
the issue is framed in terms of protecting the individual against
invasion of privacy, but the problem is essentially one of a first
amendment nature.48
" Cases which forbid government to compel affirmation of a belief include Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).

14 Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). Recognition of the captive-audience principle also appears in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 542 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-11 (1975); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305-08 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. National Broadcasting Co., 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1973); Rowan v. United

States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970). The Rowan and Erznoznik cases involved the validity of government regulation of private speech alleged to have involved a
captive audience. Commentators on the captive audience issue include L. TRrsE, supra note
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There are, of course, difficulties in application of the "captive
audience" principle. Thus a majority of the Supreme Court did not
support the claim in the Pollak case, and only Justice Douglas
found that the advertising at issue in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, noted above, was directed at a captive audience. The tension between the principle outlawing a captive audience and that
granting a right of access is apparent. At what point is a person
expected to turn away from an unwanted sight or message, and at
what point is it considered that such a person has been compelled
to see or to listen? Moreover, the system of compulsory education
has never been thought to raise a "captive audience" issue, presumably because it deals with children and because those who can
afford to do so are allowed to opt out. Despite these frayed edges,
however, the captive audience doctrine remains firm.
A second form of governmental expression that clearly contravenes the principles of the first amendment is covert expression.
Concealment of the fact that the origin of the expression is the
government itself serves no valid purpose and subverts the system
of freedom of expression. Although nondisclosure of the source of
private speech is often necessary to prevent retaliation against the
speaker, no such justification applies in the case of governmental
speech. On the other hand, failure to disclose governmental participation in the system creates a false appearance of independence,
seriously distorts the system, and undermines public confidence.
There are no Supreme Court decisions that address this issue, but
the principle that covert expression is impermissible under the
first amendment cannot be doubted.
Governmental expression directed at a captive audience has not
occurred on any significant scale to date in the United States.
Likewise, covert expression, though widely practiced by the CIA in
the recent past, apparently does not pose a serious problem at the
present time. Nevertheless, as 1984 draws near, we would do well
to remember the constitutional protections against these abuses of
governmental expression.

6, §§ 12-19; Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1953); Haiman, Speech v. Privacy:Is There a Right Not to be Spoken
To?, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 153 (1972); Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974
SuP. CT. REv. 233, 262-72.
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B. ProhibitedAreas for Governmental Expression
Certain areas are foreclosed to the government either because
the expression would violate an express constitutional prohibition
or because the expression would not relate to a proper function of
government. The two main areas of this nature are expression concerned with religion and expression taking sides in partisan
politics.
1. Religion. The first amendment guarantees free exercise of religion and prohibits an establishment of religion. Regardless of how
narrow an interpretation is given to the free exercise clause or how
low the wall of separation between church and state, these provisions plainly prohibit governmental expression supporting or opposing religion in general or any particular form of religion. It is
true that individual members of the government frequently invoke
the name of a particular deity or otherwise express support for a
particular religious belief or religious group. Such conduct, like the
motto "In God We Trust" on our coins, traditionally has not been
considered, on de minimis or other grounds, a violation of the first
amendment. Or, at least, no remedy has been devised so far. Yet
the basic principle holds that governmental expression attempting
to carry governmental support or opposition beyond these customary points runs squarely counter to the letter and spirit of the religion clauses of the first amendment.
Application of this principle involves making some difficult distinctions. In the first place, the principle implies, if not a definition
of "religion," at least a differentiation between "religious" and
"secular" viewpoints. In most cases, making this judgment is not a
problem; the proper classification is clear beyond dispute. At
times, however, drawing the distinction may arouse controversy.
Current efforts to require the teaching of "creationism" in the public schools, on a par with or as an alternative to the theory of
evolution, pose such an issue. In this situation, it is necessary to
examine the nature of the expression, the extent to which it rests
on faith rather than empirical fact, the degree to which it partakes
of a traditional religious orientation, and perhaps even the motivation behind the expression. These are all considerations that the
government, including the judicial branch, usually is forbidden to
take into account so far as private expression is concerned. But
when governmental expression touches on religion, such considerations cannot be avoided.
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In the case of "creationism," for instance, it would be relevant
that the theory was based upon the Bible, clearly a religious
source; that it was predicated on the conduct of a "divine being,"
clearly a religious concept; and, that it was held as a matter of
dogma or faith, clearly not a secular foundation. Under such circumstances, it would seem to follow that the teaching of "creationism" in the public schools would be governmental expression of a
religious viewpoint and hence forbidden by the first amendment.
Indeed, the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a negative-interference case, Epperson v. Arkansas, where it invalidated
a state statute that forbade teaching "the theory or doctrine that
mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals."
As time goes on, far closer questions may be presented."
A second distinction implied in the prohibition against governmental expression in the field of religion involves the difference
between advocating or opposing religion and talking about religion;
in a public school context, the distinction is between "teaching religion" and "teaching about religion." Thus, although it would violate the first amendment to teach "creationism" in a public school
as fact or dogma, it does not infringe upon the first amendment to
teach about "creationism" as a social phenomenon. While this distinction is reasonably clear in theory, it becomes hazy in practice,
especially for a particular teacher in a schoolroom context. For reasons developed later, only in egregious cases would it be feasible, or
indeed desirable, to call an individual teacher to account. Nevertheless, the basic principle must remain intact.
2. PartisanPolitics. The other main area from which governmental expression should be excluded is that of "partisan politics."
Here again, the lines are difficult to draw. Clearly, most governmental expression is "political" in nature. It is the business of government to govern the country on behalf of the people as a whole
and that operation is by its very nature "political," calling for expression that deals with "political" issues. On the other hand, it is
not the function of government to use the common resources of the
country to support or oppose a particular person or group seeking
political power. The selection of those who are to compose the government is the prerogative of the sovereign people. Nor is it the
function of the government to engage in activities designed to or17

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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ganize or mobilize individual citizens for political decisionmaking.
That also is the function of the electorate. The government's obligation to represent the people as a whole demands that it refrain
from such forms of "partisan politics."
It follows that the use of governmental expression to support a
particular candidate for political office is not permissible. Here, as
in the case of religion, there are some traditional and perhaps necessary qualifications. Government officials in power, particularly at
the higher levels, customarily make speeches or otherwise campaign for their own reelection or for the success of their party. Frequently this is done "on government time." As long as it is confined to top policymaking officials and does not involve direct
expenditure of government funds, it may be overlooked. Beyond
this point, however, any governmental support of particular candidates or parties in an election is improper and not within the constitutional power of government.
A more difficult question arises with respect to governmental expression where an issue, rather than a candidate, is submitted to
popular vote, as in the case of a referendum on a proposed constitutional amendment. Obviously, the government should have the
right to pursue its policies through providing information, opinion,
and argument on such questions. Yet it would seem equally certain
that it is not a proper function of government to organize a detailed campaign, staffed by government employees and complete
with committees, meetings, rallies, mailing lists, and door-to-door
canvassing. The point at which governmental expression becomes
"partisan" in this sense may be subject to disagreement. Yet the
principle involved would seem clear.
A similar principle would apply to lobbying of the legislature by
the executive branch of government. Direct approaches to legislative committees or individual members of the legislature, with information, argument, and assistance, are commonplace and necessary. On the other hand, engaging in a grass roots campaign among
voters to organize direct pressure on the legislature should be left
to private citizens. This is a problem, of course, about which the
legislative branch is likely to be sensitive and for which legislative
remedies are often available.
The Supreme Court has never passed directly on these issues.
Nevertheless, the distinction between partisan politics and other
political activities has received recognition. In Branti v. Finkel, the
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Court held that the dismissal of two county assistant public defenders, solely on the ground that they were members of the Republican Party, violated their first amendment rights. The question before it, the Court said, was "whether the hiring authority
can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved."
The Court answered that question by saying unequivocally that
"partisan political interests" could never be considered relevant to
the performance of the job of assistant public defender. Similarly,
the Hatch Act, which forbids government employees to take "an
active part in political management or political campaigns," is
aimed at partisan political conduct. While the Hatch Act can be
criticized as imposing overbroad restraints upon government employees acting in their individual capacity, it is based upon a policy
that differentiates between partisan and other political activity. A
similar policy is expressed in the provision of the Public Broadcasting Act that prohibits the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
from endorsing candidates or political parties. Finally, those state
and lower federal courts that have had occasion to rule on these
questions have, by and large, reached results consistent with the
principles set forth above.48
C.

Government Institutions Designed to Educate and Inform
the Citizenry

A substantial portion of governmental expression takes place
within the framework of government institutions designed to educate and inform members of the polity. One goal of such institutions is, of course, socialization. They are concerned with passing
on the history, culture, and ways of thinking that are necessary to
obtain a viable consensus. In a democratic society, however, these
institutions also have the task of developing in the individual citi4' Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
The Hatch Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976), was upheld in United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). The Public Broadcasting Act provision is 47 U.S.C. § 396(f) (1976). State and federal decisions include Stern
v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal.
3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976); Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver
School Dist. No. 1, 459 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978); Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 762,
151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1978). For discussion of these and other cases, see Yudof, supra note 3,
at 912-17; Note, supra note 6, at 536-45.
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zen independence, creative thinking, the ability to solve problems,
and similar qualities. Tension exists between the goals of achieving
socialization in aid of a sense of collective responsibility on the one
hand and achieving autonomy and diversity on the other. Ultimately, some balance must be struck. However that is done, the
role of governmental expression in the operation of these educational and informational institutions is somewhat different from its
role in aid of the day-to-day operations of governance. Governmental participation is justified, and the system of freedom of expression advanced, only if governmental expression supports the pluralist forces in the structure. The affirmative side of the first
amendment, therefore, imposes some obligation on the part of the
government to maintain these institutions on an open and democratic basis.
What should be the function of the courts in guiding this development? Some sense of the problem can be gained by a brief examination of governmental participation in two important institutions - public education and public libraries.
1. Public Education. The system of public education is a major
area of governmental participation in expression. There are some
external controls over the manner in which the government manages this institution. Thus, under the doctrine of Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, parents may opt out of the system altogether, providing
they can afford to pay for an equivalent private education. Likewise, competition from private educational institutions, especially
at the university level, operates as a spur and a check upon the
public educational structure. Yet, by and large, assurance that
public education will not lapse into an instrument for inculcating a
sterile conformity must come from internal principles built into
the system itself.4 '
The doctrinal basis for judicial intervention to maintain the
open features of the public education system has long existed. The
rationale of Pierce was that the "fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only." The Court added:
"The child is not the mere creature of the State." In West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, outlawing the compulsory flag sa"1

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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lute in public schools, the Court stressed the constitutional obligation of the school system to assure the "freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse." Epperson v. Arkansas confirmed that
the courts "have not failed to apply the First Amendment's mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the
fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District reiterated
that "[ilt can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate."5 0
It is true that judicial controls over the public school system
must be exercised with care and restraint. Detailed supervision by
the courts over the operations of the schools is not feasible; nor
would it advance the cause of free expression. But here again, the
courts must perform the role of keeping alive the fundamental
principles at stake and intervening where clear threats to those
principles appear.
Implementation of the constitutional obligation of the government to maintain an open system of public education involves the
development of a set of subsidiary principles. At least two such
principles are of major importance. The first, which applies mainly
to the top levels of the structure, is the principle of balanced presentation. The other, designed to maintain looseness, or breathing
space, in the lower levels of the system, embodies the concept of
academic freedom.
The principle of balanced presentation derives from the nature
of the government's duty to avoid narrow or one-sided indoctrination. It is buttressed by the monopoly, or near monopoly, position
occupied by the government in the area of education, by the quasicaptive character of the recipients of the government's communication, and by broad right-to-know considerations. In essence, it requires that, in designing curriculum, adopting text books, prescrib50Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641
(1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). Other cases where the Supreme
Court has stressed the importance of an open system of education include Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). See also Note, ChallengingIdeological
Exclusion of Curriculum Material:Rights of Students and Parents, 14 HAMnv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 485, 492-503 (1979). But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
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ing classroom plans, and making similar policy decisions, the
school authorities must provide a fair coverage of the information,
ideas, opinions, and approaches to the subject matter involved.
The inquiry is not into whether the decisionmakers have considered "ideological content" rather than "educational value" - they
have to consider those matters - but whether they have provided
a rounded view of the relevant materials. The issue of what is "relevant," in turn, must be determined upon the basis of prevailing
standards in the educational, scholarly, and scientific communities.
Application of the balanced-presentation requirement in extreme cases does not pose a difficult problem. For example, a
school system that made no provision for curricular materials dealing with black history, ideas, or contributions would not meet the
test, and an institution that failed to give a course in astrology
would not be compelled to do so. Other situations, such as the mix
of theories taught in the social sciences, would entail more troublesome questions. As suggested above, the courts should intervene
only where failure to observe the principle is relatively clear.
The concept of academic freedom has a long history in this
country. Developing out of the struggles for greater freedom in research, publication, and teaching at institutions of higher learning,
the basic precepts have been elaborated and refined, embodied in
formal statements, applied in concrete cases, and developed into a
kind of common law by such organizations as the American Association of University Professors. Although the tenets of academic
freedom have never been incorporated fully into the first amendment, they have greatly influenced the courts in cases involving
governmental intervention in the affairs of academic institutions.
They are well-suited to the task of defining the rights of
subordinate participants in the public education structure along
lines that will make room for experimentation, diversity, creativeness, and independence of thought. Thus, applying academic-freedom principles, a faculty member would be given substantial leeway in the manner of presentation of the subject, the choice of
additional reading materials, the exposition of ideas, pursuit of
academic interests outside the classroom, and other aspects of life
and work in the institution. Similarly, students who perform delegated institutional functions, such as editing a newspaper subsidized by public funds, would be free to carry on their editorial duties without detailed interference from superior officials. The
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dividing line between permissible control from the top and freedom at the operating level would be based, once again, upon the
macro-micro distinction. Choice of the subject matter to be taught,
for instance, would be the prerogative of the top level in the structure, but the details of class presentation would be, within the limits of competency, the domain of the teacher. 1
Supreme Court decisions to date have been consistent with the
foregoing analysis but, with the exception of the teacher-loyalty
cases, the Court has had little occasion so far to deal with these
problems. Lower courts have been divided in their approaches and
results. The issues are being raised with greater frequency and urgency, and significant developments soon may occur.52
2. Public Libraries. Public libraries are also institutions that, in
a democratic society, are designed not only for transmitting past
culture but for developing autonomy and diversity. Here right-toknow factors are especially strong. This form of governmental participation in expression, therefore, is required by the first amendment to serve the needs of an open society. Public-school libraries
have, in one sense, a narrower purpose, in that they are intended
for the use only of the school population, but the constitutional
obligation to encourage democratic values there is equally, if not
more, compelling.
The basic principle governing the application of the first amendment to the maintenance of a public library is the principle of a
balanced presentation. The selection and removal of books must be
done on a basis that fairly takes into account differing ideas, viewpoints, and treatments of the subject, within the boundaries of
prevailing professional standards. Put in other terms, the govern" Cases where the Supreme Court has utilized concepts of academic freedom in upholding individual rights against governmental intervention include Papish v. Board of Curators,
410 U.S. 667 (1973); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
52 The lower court cases are collected in 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 805-90 (4th ed.

1976). See also R.

O'NEIL, CLASSROOMS IN THE CROSSFIRE

(1981); Hirschoff, Parentsand the

Public School Curriculum:Is There a Right to Have One's Child Excused From Objectionable Instruction?, 50 So. CAL. L. REV. 871 (1977); Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards, and
the Constitution,80 COLUM. L. REV. 1092 (1980); Note, supra note 50, at 489-92; Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (1968); Note, PublicForum
Theory in the EducationalSetting: The First Amendment and the Student Press, 1979 U.
ILL. L.F. 879.
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ment may not draw too tightly the circle around the right of the
users of the library to obtain certain information, entertain certain
opinions, or read or hear about certain ideas. The government
may, of course, limit the scope of the facility to a specified area a macro decision - but within that area it may not make the
micro decision to censor out particular points of view.
Implementation of this principle, of course, is not without its
difficulties. Yet they are not insuperable. For one thing, the range
of materials available in a library is considerably broader than that
of materials used in a classroom; hence judgments about inclusion
and exclusion need be less refined and are more susceptible to review by judicial authority. Likewise, at least in instances where
books are removed because of ideological content, the reasons are
likely to come out in the open; in such cases, the objectives sought
by removal usually are not achieved through secrecy. Finally, once
again, problems of implementation in this field should not be a
ground for abandoning the principle.
The issues presented in book-removal cases, which are becoming
more and more common, are well illustrated by Pico v. Board of
Education,Island Trees School District, now before the Supreme
Court. In Pico, three members of the Board of Education of the
Island Trees School District on Long Island attended a conference
sponsored by "a conservative organization" at which "lists of books
considered objectionable by some persons together with excerpts"
were distributed. Subsequently, two of the Board members
checked one of the lists against the card index in the school libraries, and the Board, after an informal meeting, ordered the principals of the schools to remove a number of "objectionable" volumes.
The Board's action soon became known in the community and resulted in considerable controversy. The Board defended its action
on the ground that the books "were anti-American, anti-Christian,
anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy." After a public hearing, appointment of a committee of school staff and parents, and reconsideration, the Board voted to return two books to the library but
directed that eight others be removed. The banned books included
The Fixer, by Bernard Malamud; Slaughterhouse-Five, by Kurt
Vonnegut; The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down These
Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas; Best Short Stories by Negro Writers, by Langston Hughes; and Soul on Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver. A
group of students brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief.
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The district judge granted the Board of Education's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that its actions "did not sharply
implicate first amendment values," but fell "within the broad
range of discretion constitutionally afforded
to educational officials
5' 3
who are elected by the community.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a two-to-one
vote, reversed and remanded the case for trial. Judge Sifton took
the position that, although the mere removal of a controversial
book would not make out a prima facie violation of the first
amendment, in this case the "unusual and irregular intervention in
the school libraries' operation by persons not routinely concerned
with such matters," the "ambiguous" explanation offered by the
Board of Education for its actions, and other "irregularities" created the inference that "political views and personal taste are being asserted not in the interests of the children's well-being, but
rather for the purpose of establishing those views as the correct
5 4
and orthodox ones for all purposes in the particular community.
Judge Newman, concurring in the result, argued that the "plenary power of school officials transgresses First Amendment limits
...when their actions tend to suppress ideas." "It is one thing to
teach, to urge the correctness of a point of view," he said, but "it is
quite another to take an action that condemns an idea, that places
it beyond the pale of free discussion and scrutiny." The removal of
a book from the school library, he declared, "can.

.

.pose a sub-

stantial threat of suppression." This is especially true "when the
disapproval is political in nature - when exclusion of particular
views is motivated by the authorities' opinion about the proper
way to organize and run society in general." Because the complaint
alleged that the removal "was motivated in part by the School
Board's objection to the political views expressed in those books,"
and the action "was taken under circumstances that pose a threat
to the free expression and exchange of ideas within the school community," Judge Newman concluded that a trial was necessary to
determine "precisely what happened" and whether, "in the circumstances of this case, the School Board's actions

. . .

created a

sufficient risk of suppressing ideas to constitute a violation of the
63 Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 398 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
5- 638 F.2d 404, 414-15, 417 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. 1981).
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First Amendment." 5

Judge Mansfield dissented. He believed that "this court should
keep its hands off," that it was improper "to substitute a court's
view of what student curriculum is appropriate for that of the
Board." As to the merits of the first amendment issue, he contended that "the First Amendment entitles students to reasonable
freedom of expression but not to freedom from what some may
consider to be excessively moralistic or conservative selection by
school'56authorities of library books to be used as educational
tools.

The three opinions present three possible approaches to the
problem. Judge Mansfield believes the courts should not intervene
at all in decisions by the school authorities regarding the selection
or removal of books from school libraries. Judge Sifton's view is
that a violation of the first amendment occurs when the circumstances of removal show that the judgment of the school authorities was made not on the basis of educational value but to establish
certain views as the correct or orthodox ones. Judge Newman holds
that the first amendment issue is whether the actions of the school
board in fact created a risk of belief in the community that certain
ideas were officially disfavored, and that the existence of such an
actual risk must be demonstrated at the trial.
None of these approaches is entirely satisfactory. Judge Mansfield's nonintervention would mean, of course, that no judicial remedy existed no matter how flagrant the violation of the first
amendment by the school authorities might be. Judge Sifton's inquiry into whether the purpose of the Board of Education was
based on educational value or an intent to suppress ideas requires
proof of motivation, always difficult to establish. Moreover, Judge
Sifton passes rather lightly over the dilemma that the function of
the school authorities is to make decisions on the contents of books
and that any decision to exclude necessarily results in withholding
the ideas expressed in the excluded book from the users of the library. Judge Newman relies upon a "chilling effect" theory, seek" Id. at 432, 433, 434, 439.

Id. at 419, 432. Judge Mansfield stressed that most of the objections to the books or-

dered removed was that they contained indecent or vulgar materials. It is clear, however,
that Judge Mansfield would have reached the same conclusion quite apart from that issue,
which is not considered here.
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ing to determine the impact of the removal upon the community.
This approach has the advantage of reflecting the reality in many
book-removal cases and seeks to focus on some of the more objective facets of the situation. On the other hand, it makes the issue
turn upon the manner of removal; removal of books done quietly
and without fanfare would not, on this theory, constitute a violation of the first amendment. Moreover, it imposes the burden of
making an elaborate presentation upon those challenging the action of the school authorities. Most important, it does not extend
protection to the full extent of first amendment theory; it fails to
take into account the rights of the users of the library to have access to a variety of points of view.
The principle of balanced presentation provides an alternative
theory: the Board of Education in Pico has drawn the boundaries
of a school library arbitrarily and too narrowly. The kind of information, ideas, and viewpoints found in Down These Mean Streets,
Soul on Ice, or Slaughterhouse-Fiveclearly should not be cast out
of a high-school library as "anti-American." The excluded books
all met professional standards of quality. The circumstances of the
case, such as the "unusual and irregular intervention" by the
school board and the impact on the community, confirm this judgment. The motivation and "chilling effect" theories need not be
discarded; they should remain as supplemental approaches. But
the balanced-presentation doctrine seems to encompass the full
scope of first amendment theory and to be most relevant to the
functioning of a system of freedom of expression.5
D. Structural Arrangements to Provide Greater Diversity in
Governmental Expression
As in the case of governmental promotion of the system of freedom, of expression, when government itself engages in expression,
certain structural arrangements can be devised to lessen the dangers and increase the diversity of governmental expression. Such
structures include delegation of authority and decentralization, the
creation of autonomous bodies that develop their own professional
67 For other discussion of the library books problem, see Estreicher, supra note 52;
O'Neil, Libraries,Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 209 (1973); Note,
Censoringthe School Library: Do Students Have the Right to Read?, 10 CONN. L. REv. 747
(1978).
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standards and traditions, the shielding of the government communicators from partisan political forces, and the like. The impact of
these arrangements is to give governmental participation in the
system an effect somewhat closer to that of governmental promotion of the system. It should be noted that this result is not always
desirable. It may be that the government should speak in a single,
clear voice or that government communicators should not be cut
off in elitist fashion from the active political forces of the community. Where circumstances warrant it, however, arrangements of
the kind enumerated are available.
In some areas, subordinate governmental officials and subordinate political subdivisions are subject to the complete control,
so far as official expression is concerned, of their superior officers
or authority. For example, the government may prohibit police,
prosecutors, and other government agents from revealing information that would prejudice the right of an accused to a fair trial. In
addition, the government may, of course, prevent its employees
from disclosing secret information vital to national security. Similarly, although the issue seems never to have been decided formally, a state may prevent a municipality or other political subdivision from engaging in political or any other kind of expression."
There are some areas, however, where the government should be
structured in such a way as to create semi-autonomous enclaves in
which government officials function without direct control over
their immediate operations by higher or centralized authority. One
major area of this nature, as previously noted, is that of public
education, where the principles of academic freedom give teachers,
administrators, and students leeway to develop and carry on their
own traditions. Another area, likewise mentioned above, is that of
libraries, museums, and the like, where professional standards provide a buffer against special-interest forces. Professor Canby has
pointed out that government institutions performing an "editorial
function," such as student newspapers, law reviews, radio and television stations, and similar enterprises have been protected in the
courts against intervention in the day-to-day conduct of their affairs. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting is another example
of an agency intended to operate with a substantial degree of inde" See Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1978), appeal dismissed, 439
U.S. 1060 (1979); Yudof, supra note 3, at 865-69.
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pendence from the government. 9
The autonomy of these government institutions rests in part on
statutory provisions but increasingly on constitutional grounds. To
a large extent, the system operates on the distinction between
macro-level decisions and micro-level decisions. Higher echelons of
government determine broad policy, the autonomous agency functions within the limits of that policy, and the higher echelons do
not interfere on a selective basis. These methods of blunting the
monopolistic effects of governmental participation in expression
have significant potential.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the system of freedom of expression is to operate effectively in
our society, now and in the future, we must give more attention to
the affirmative side of the first amendment. Grave distortions in
the system cannot be eased or eliminated without measures that go
beyond the traditional safeguards to protect expression against
governmental interference, as crucial as those safeguards continue
to be. The expanding role of government in promoting and participating in the system brings with it serious dangers but also carries
a great potential. If that potential is to be realized, however, the
basic principles under which the opportunities for expression by
individuals and groups can be expanded, and expression by government and its agencies kept within bounds, must become an
integral part of our political philosophy.
In this task the judicial branch of government has a difficult role
to play. The emerging doctrines, such as the macro-micro division
of powers and the principle of balanced presentation, are vague
and unformed, at least at this stage. There is danger that the
looser rules necessarily invoked on the affirmative side of the first
amendment may result in relaxation of the rules applicable to the
negative noninterference side. Many will think it is not wise to inject the courts into situations where, at times, they can deal only
with egregious cases rather than exercise more complete control
over the implementation of constitutional principles.
These are serious problems, but they can be overcome. The
59 Cf. Canby, supra note 3, at 1134-64; Note, Freeing Public BroadcastingFrom UnconstitutionalRestraints, 89 YALE L.J. 719 (1980) (both emphasize the excessive governmental
entanglement with the Corporation).
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courts have been and must remain the keeper of the American conscience in upholding the rights of the individual against encroachment by the government. They should continue this role in dealing
with the affirmative side of the first amendment. Indeed, here the
courts are on a one-way road: to the extent that they are willing to
act, the result can only be an expansion, not a restriction, of the
system of freedom of expression. Already we have traveled further
along this road than many of us realize, but much further progress
remains.

